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When our brain detects an error, this process changes how we react on ensuing trials.
People show post-error adaptations, potentially to improve their performance in the near
future. At least three types of behavioral post-error adjustments have been observed.
These are post-error slowing (PES), post-error reduction of interference, and post-error
improvement in accuracy (PIA). Apart from these behavioral changes, post-error adapta-
tions have also been observed on a neuronal level with functional magnetic resonance
imaging and electroencephalography. Neuronal post-error adaptations comprise activity
increase in task-relevant brain areas, activity decrease in distracter-encoding brain areas,
activity modulations in the motor system, and mid-frontal theta power increases. Here, we
review the current literature with respect to these post-error adjustments, discuss under
which circumstances these adjustments can be observed, and whether the different types
of adjustments are linked to each other.We also evaluate different approaches for explain-
ing the functional role of PES. In addition, we report reanalyzed and follow-up data from
a ﬂanker task and a moving dots interference task showing (1) that PES and PIA are not
necessarily correlated, (2) that PES depends on the response–stimulus interval, and (3)
that PES is reliable on a within-subject level over periods as long as several months.
Keywords: post-error slowing, post-error reduction of interference, post-error improvement in accuracy, cognitive
control, orienting response, inhibition, posterior medial frontal cortex
When we realize that we have just committed an error, we often
stop our current movement for a brief moment or at least we slow
down a little bit. This might help us to focus on our task again –
that is, to pay more attention to the relevant aspects of the task
and ignore irrelevant information – or to realize why we commit-
ted an error or what exactly the error was. Alternatively, we slow
down just because we are surprised about the unexpected event of
committing an error. Sometimes our performance improves after
the commission of an error. However, it is yet unknown under
which exact circumstances we improve. At least three types of
post-error adjustments have been observed. These are post-error
slowing (PES; e.g.,Rabbitt, 1966;Debener et al., 2005; Eichele et al.,
2010), post-error reduction of interference (PERI; Ridderinkhof
et al., 2002; King et al., 2010), and post-error improvements in
accuracy (PIA; e.g., Laming, 1968; Marco-Pallares et al., 2008;
Danielmeier et al., 2011). There is increasing evidence that PES
is independent from the other post-error adjustments, but that
two or more post-error adjustment processes might occur in par-
allel. In the following, we will summarize what is known about
each of these post-error adjustments and complement this with
own data on PES.
POST-ERROR SLOWING
Post-error slowing describes the prolonged reaction time (RT) in
trials subsequent to an error compared to RTs in trials following
correct trials (Rabbitt, 1966; Laming,1968). PEShas been observed
in a variety of different tasks, for instance in ﬂanker (Debener et al.,
2005; Krämer et al., 2007; Cavanagh et al., 2009; Eichele et al.,
2010), Stroop (Gehring and Fencsik, 2001), Simon (King et al.,
2010; Danielmeier et al., 2011), or categorization (Jentzsch and
Dudschig, 2009) tasks. However, other studies reported conditions
under which no PES effects were observed (e.g., Ullsperger and
Szymanowski, 2004; Fiehler et al., 2005). Two recent experiments
found PES only in conditions where error trials were infrequent,
while observing post-correct slowing when correct trials were
infrequent (Notebaert et al., 2009; Nunez Castellar et al., 2010).
Thus, it is yet unclear underwhich conditions PES can be observed,
and what the underlying mechanisms are. It has been suggested
that PES is either related to cognitive control processes associated
with the error (Ridderinkhof et al., 2004), or that it is related to
inhibitory motor processes (Marco-Pallares et al., 2008), or that
it reﬂects attentional re-orientation (orienting account; Notebaert
et al., 2009) not fulﬁlling any speciﬁc and direct function in terms
of performance improvement. In the following we present these
theoretical accounts in more detail, then we discuss various fac-
tors that might inﬂuence PES. We also report two experiments
investigating (1) the inﬂuence of trial timing on PES, and (2) the
intra-individual reliability of PES.
THREE ACCOUNTS EXPLAINING PES
On the one hand it has been argued that PES is related to cognitive
control mechanisms which are implemented after the commission
of errors (Botvinick et al., 2001). On the other hand there is evi-
dence that PES reﬂects an orienting response following infrequent
events like errors (Notebaert et al., 2009). Additionally, an inhibi-
tion account is supported by functional and structural anatomical
studies and EEG experiments showing that motor inhibition is
related to PES (Ridderinkhof, 2002b; Marco-Pallares et al., 2008).
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In the following we will discuss these three explanations for PES,
which, to our opinion, are not mutually exclusive.
Cognitive control account
Gehring and Fencsik (2001) suggested that PES is a compensatory
control mechanism serving to improve subsequent performance.
Thus, in contrast to the orienting account, it is assumed that PES
serves a functionally meaningful purpose (cf. Carter and vanVeen,
2007). Speciﬁcally, it has been suggested that PES serves to buy
time to enable more controlled responding (Ridderinkhof et al.,
2004). Alternatively, it has been suggested that cognitive control
in post-error trials leads to engagement of attentional top-down
modulations (MacDonald et al., 2000).
Within the conﬂict monitoring theory (Botvinick et al., 2001)
PES is explained in terms of decreased activity in the response
priming unit, which equals an increased motor threshold. This
strongly links the cognitive control account with the inhibition
account (see below). The assumption of decreased activity in
the response unit is supported by fMRI results showing reduced
motor activity in post-error trials (King et al., 2010) which is
negatively correlated with PES (Danielmeier et al., 2011), i.e., par-
ticipants with less motor activity in post-error trials show larger
PES effects. Motor activity, in turn, was predicted by activity in
the performance monitoring network, comprising the posterior
median frontal cortex (pMFC), in preceding error trials,withmore
error-related pMFC activity predicting less motor activity. Since
this is a correlational ﬁnding one cannot conclude whether pMFC
activity causes the decrease in motor activity, for instance via a
purposeful adjustment in speed–accuracy thresholds as suggested
by Botvinick et al. (2001), or whether the observed activity adjust-
ments just occur coincidentally together. Increased pMFC activity
might be the reaction to an error, which also leads to an orienting
response that in turn causes the slowing of motor responses.
The cognitive control theory assumes that post-error adjust-
ments are triggered by top-down signals from the performance
monitoring system, which has been associated with the pMFC.
Several fMRI ﬁndings support this assumption by showing a cor-
relation between pMFC activity and PES (Garavan et al., 2002;
Kerns et al., 2004;Klein et al., 2007a;Chevrier and Schachar, 2010).
Also, the amplitude of the error-related negativity (ERN; Gehring
et al., 1993; Debener et al., 2005; West and Travers, 2008; Wes-
sel and Ullsperger, 2011) as well as a mid-frontal power increase
(Cavanagh et al., 2009) have been shown to predict the amount
of PES in EEG experiments. Some fMRI studies associated PES
with increased dorsolateral prefrontal activity in post-error tri-
als (Kerns et al., 2004), which is thought to be driven by pMFC
activations (for a review see Carter and van Veen, 2007).
However, some studies did not ﬁnd any correlation between
pMFC activity and PES (Gehring and Fencsik, 2001), while oth-
ers found a correlation between PES and the error positivity (Pe),
instead of the ERN (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; Hajcak et al., 2003).
Although these results might seem contradictory, one potential
reason for some studies ﬁnding a correlation and others not,might
be that pMFC activity and PES are linked only indirectly. It has
been shown that PES is linked to pMFC activity in error trials
via an activity decrease in the motor system (King et al., 2010;
Danielmeier et al., 2011).
Thus, there is evidence that PES is related to activity in the
performance monitoring system, whether directly or indirectly,
and therefore, PES might reﬂect the implementation of cognitive
control.
Orienting account
Notebaert et al. (2009) suggested that PES reﬂects an orienting
response to an unexpected event. Since errors are usually rare,
they represent unexpected, motivationally salient events. Thus,
according to this account, PES is independent from cognitive
control processes. Based on this idea, Notebaert et al. (2009) com-
pared the reaction to errors with the reaction to oddball stimuli,
which are also infrequent events. Usually, RT slowing can also be
observed after surprising (infrequent) events. This might be due
to an orienting response elicited by these stimuli. A similar ori-
enting response might be elicited by errors and can be observed as
PES. Notebaert et al. (2009) compared an experimental condition
where errors were relatively infrequent with another condition
where errors were committed frequently and correct trials were
infrequent. With infrequent errors, PES was observed as expected.
However, when correct trials were infrequent, they observed a
post-correct slowing instead. This indicates that PES is not neces-
sarily only reﬂecting post-error adaptation processes, but depends
on the relative frequency of errors. Thus, PES might be an orient-
ing response to an unexpected event, instead of an error-driven
cognitive control adjustment.
In an EEG experiment, Nunez Castellar et al. (2010) observed
that post-errorRTs correlatewith the P3 amplitude. TheP3, specif-
ically the P3a, has been associated with the novelty processing of
an orienting response (Friedman et al., 2001). Thus, the orienting
account is corroborated by this ERP ﬁnding.
It has also been suggested that PES results from a failure to
disengage from the error (Carp and Compton, 2009) or, more
generally, from a failure to disengage from performance problems
including increased response conﬂict (Compton et al., 2011). Usu-
ally people brieﬂy disengage from the task after correct responses.
This has been observed as alpha power increase (indicating a
more relaxed status) after correct trials compared to periods fol-
lowing high conﬂict (e.g., errors). Reduced alpha power after
erroneous responses might reﬂect heightened arousal or orient-
ing responses and therefore could also support the orienting
account.
Studies that potentially support the orienting idea of PES are
those where PES only occurs in conditions where fewer errors
are committed. For instance, Ullsperger and Szymanowski (2004)
foundPESonly in the accuracy condition,where participants com-
mitted fewer errors than in the speed condition. Also, Fiehler et al.
(2005) divided their subjects in two groups: one group was explic-
itly instructed to correct their errors immediately, whereas the
second group was not aware that they could correct their errors.
The second group committed fewer errors than the ﬁrst group,
and only the second group showed PES.
If, in contrast, PES reﬂected cognitive control processes in the
sense that PES serves to improve behavior, one would expect
improvements in post-error performance (PIA) to co-occur with
PES. Indeed, there are several studies reporting both PES and PIA
(Laming,1968,1979;Marco-Pallares et al., 2008;Danielmeier et al.,
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2011). But there are also studies reporting PES in combination
with decreased accuracy in post-error trials (Rabbitt and Rodgers,
1977; Fiehler et al., 2005).
However, even if both PES and PIA are shown within the same
experiment, this does not necessarily involve a correlation between
both factors (Carp and Compton, 2009), i.e., participants with a
large PES effect are not necessarily the same participants who show
large post-error improvement rates (but see Hajcak et al., 2003,
who did ﬁnd a correlation between PES and PIA). In one of our
experiments (Danielmeier et al., 2011) we found both PES and
PIA, but the effects did not correlate on the individual subjects
level (r= 0.25, p= 0.28; Figure 1). The fact that PES does not nec-
essarily go along with a subsequent performance improvement
seems to speak against a direct role for PES in enhancing accu-
racy. Also, PERI, which is assumed to reﬂect strategic adjustments
in response to errors, and therefore could represent the result of
cognitive control processes, does not correlate with PES (King
et al., 2010). One possibility could be that PES and cognitive con-
trol processes sometimes co-occur within a similar time period,
but that these processes are more or less independent. Although,
we suggest that PES might have a permissive effect on top-down
modulations.
However, if PES just represented a general orienting response
to surprising events, one would expect a comparable response
after errors and after surprising false feedback (i.e., signaling the
subject an error although the response was correct). But at least
three studies have shown that subjects slow down only after self-
committed errors, but not after inserted or externally induced
errors, i.e., when subjects actually responded correctly (De Bruijn
et al., 2004b; Logan and Crump, 2010; Steinhauser and Kiesel,
2011). This suggests that, although there is slowing to a certain
extent following infrequent events (e.g., Notebaert et al., 2009), a
surprising external event is not always sufﬁcient to evoke PES.
FIGURE 1 | Post-error slowing and post-error improvement in accuracy
(PIA) did not correlate significantly in a colored-moving dot
interference task (Danielmeier et al., 2011). Participants showed either
both PES and PIA (upper right quadrant) or only PIA without PES (upper left
quadrant). One participant showed only PES without improvement and two
subjects showed neither PES nor PIA following errors.
Inhibitory account
Within the activation–suppression hypothesis Ridderinkhof
(2002b) already suggested that the commission of an error leads
to an increase in selective suppression in the post-error trial. This
was revealed by more negative slopes in the RT delta plots of post-
error compared to post-correct trials. RT delta plots depict the
interference effect as function of response speed, with negative
slopes indicating a decreased or reversed interference effect with
increasing RTs. In general, the activation of the incorrect response
tendency should lead to more inhibition in the subsequent trial
(Ridderinkhof, 2002a). There is growing evidence, that a right-
hemispheric network, consisting of presupplementary motor area
(pre-SMA), lateral inferior frontal cortex (IFC), and subthalamic
nucleus (STN) is involved in PES. This network has been asso-
ciated with motor stopping or slowing (Aron et al., 2007), thus
linking PES to motor inhibition. The following studies provide
evidence for this assumption.
The inhibition hypothesis of PES was supported by data of
Marco-Pallares et al. (2008). They showed that PES correlates with
an increase in beta bandpower in anEEGexperiment. The increase
in beta band power has been associated with inhibitory processes,
and speciﬁcally with motor inhibition (Kühn et al., 2004; Marco-
Pallares et al., 2008; Swann et al., 2009). In contrast, suppressed
beta band oscillations have been associated with faster responses
(van Ede et al., 2011). Furthermore, inhibition-related beta band
modulations have been associatedwith the STN (Kühn et al., 2004)
and the right IFC (rIFC; Swann et al., 2009). The pre-SMAhas been
shown to modulate the inhibitory inﬂuence of the rIFC (Neubert
et al., 2010). The STN, rIFC, and pre-SMA are interconnected and
constitute a network that has been associated with motor stop-
ping or slowing (Aron et al., 2007) and action reprogramming
(Neubert et al., 2010). Chevrier and Schachar (2010) reported
that activity in the right SMA and the dorsal substantia nigra
(among other areas) is positively correlated with PES. Since the
dorsal substantia nigra is directly adjacent to the STN, it might be
difﬁcult to distinguish these areas in fMRI contrasts. We recently
found a correlation between individual PES values and structural
measures in this right-hemispheric pre-SMA–IFC–STN network
(Danielmeier et al., 2011), indicating that this inhibition network
also contributes to PES, and complementing the ﬁndings that this
network operates in the beta band frequency, which in turn is
correlated with PES.
The primary motor cortex (M1) is a downstream target of
inhibitory control (Swann et al., 2009). In two of our studies, we
showed reduced motor cortex activity in post-error trials (King
et al., 2010; Danielmeier et al., 2011). This reduction was related
to PES, that is, the less M1 activity in post-error trials the more
PES was observed in that person. This result supports both the
inhibitory account of PES as well as the suggestion of the conﬂict
monitoring theory (Botvinick et al., 2001) that PES reﬂects an
increased response threshold in post-error trials. Furthermore,
PES is also correlated with baseline cortisol levels, which in turn
have been associated with inhibitory behavior (Tops and Boksem,
2011), suggesting an additional link between PES and behavioral
inhibition.
Together, there is evidence that motor inhibition plays a crucial
role during PES. However, this does not exclude the possibility that
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other, probably more cognitive, processes or orienting responses
are executed simultaneously. Indeed, we showed that other adjust-
ments can be observed in extrastriate visual areas in post-error
trials (King et al., 2010; Danielmeier et al., 2011), but these
adjustments were not directly related to PES.
PES IS MODULATED BY TRIAL TIMING
Jentzsch and Dudschig (2009) showed that the PES effect is inﬂu-
enced by the response–stimulus interval (RSI). They manipulated
the RSI in a categorization task either between subjects or within
subjects in a block-wise fashion. The RSI was either short (50 ms
in Experiment 1 or 100 ms in Experiment 2) or long (1000 ms).
Although they found signiﬁcant PES effects in both conditions,
PES was considerably larger under short RSI conditions. One
question that arises from this experiment is, whether parts of this
effect are due to long-term adjustments (macro-adjustments; Rid-
derinkhof, 2002b), that is, subjects adapt to the higher frequency
of stimulus presentation, and thus larger time–pressure, in one
block compared to the other block, or whether this effect can also
be observed when the RSI varies from trial to trial and subjects
cannot adapt to a general stimulus frequency. In Experiment 1, we
replicated the timing-dependent effect of PES with a different task,
more RSI intervals, and with a randomized trial-to-trial variation
of the RSI instead of a block-wise manipulation to exclude the
effect of macro-adjustments.
Experiment 1
We conducted an experiment that employed a modiﬁed ﬂanker
task (Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974). While Jentzsch and Dudschig
(2009; Experiment 2) kept the RSI constant for the ﬁrst half of
their experiment and switched to the other RSI in the second half,
here RSIs varied from trial to trial in pseudo-random order.
Participants. Nineteen healthy volunteers (eight male; mean age:
24 years; range: 20–27 years of age) participated in this experi-
ment after signing informed consent. All participants had normal
or corrected-to-normal vision, one participant was left-handed
according to the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldﬁeld,
1971). The experiment was carried out in accordance with the
Declaration of Helsinki.
Task. An arrow version of the ﬂanker task was employed as
described in Danielmeier et al. (2009). The only difference to
that previous study was the introduction of four different RSIs,
which was either 200, 750, 1500, or 3000 ms. In this task a left-
or right-pointing arrow was presented as a target in the center
of a screen for 50 ms. Two ﬂanker arrows were presented above
the target and two below the target. Flanker arrows could either
point in the same direction as the target (congruent condition) or
in the opposite direction (incongruent condition). Flankers were
either presented close to the target (CLOSE condition, i.e., 1.75˚
and 3.5˚ above and below the target) or further away from the tar-
get (FAR condition, i.e., 4.0˚ and 6.5˚ above and below the target),
thereby creating modulations in response conﬂict (cf. Danielmeier
et al., 2009). Flanker presentation preceded the target presenta-
tion by 80 ms. Speed and accuracy were emphasized equally in the
instructions. After the participants’ response, a black screen was
presented for the durations of one of four possible RSIs. Each RSI
occurred equally often in every experimental condition, but RSI
duration varied in pseudo-randomized order. In case no response
was recorded, the next trial started after 2000 ms. In total, 996 tri-
als were presented. Stimuli were presented using Presentation 13.1
(Neurobehavioral Systems, San Francisco, CA, USA).
Results and discussion. The effects of congruency and ﬂanker
distance showed the same results as in Danielmeier et al. (2009)
for eachRSI. These results are omitted for brevity, since they arenot
relevant for our conclusion here. Error rates were 9.12, 9.97, 9.0,
and 10.23% for RSI 250, 750, 1500, and 3000 ms, respectively. The
RSIs here refer to the time interval following an error, because this
interval is crucial for post-error adaptations. There was a trend
for error rates being different for the four RSIs [F(3,16)= 2.68;
p = 0.08]. However, note that there was no way for participants to
inﬂuence the RSI following their errors, because the order of RSIs
was random and predetermined.
Post-error changes in accuracy were evaluated by comparing
post-error error rates with post-correct error rates. There was no
signiﬁcant change in any RSI. PES values were calculated as mean
post-error RT minus mean post-correct RT, with post-correct tri-
als being correctly performed trials preceded by at least two and
followed by at least one other correct trial. This analysis was done
for each RSI separately to investigate the effect of RSI on PES. The
indicated RSI here was that between error and post-error trial.
Post-error slowing differed signiﬁcantly between RSIs
[F(3,16)= 4.97; p = 0.013],with shorter RSIs leading to more PES
[mean PES values (SEM): 59 ms (21), 11 ms (12), −9 ms (10), and
−1 ms (9) for RSI 200, 750, 1500, and 3000, respectively; Figure 2].
Only forRSI 200, theRT inpost-error trialswas signiﬁcantly slower
than RTs in post-correct trials [t (18)= 2.68; p= 0.015].
Thus, we replicated the ﬁnding by Jentzsch and Dudschig
(2009), showing that PES varies with RSI. Slowing is most
FIGURE 2 | Mean post-error slowing (PES) values (and SEM) for each
response–stimulus interval (RSI). PES for RSI 200 is signiﬁcantly larger
than for RSI 1500 and 3000 (both p<0.005), and there is a trend for a
difference between RSI 200 and 750 (p =0.088). There is also a marginally
signiﬁcant difference between RSI 750 and 1500 (p =0.088). RSI 1500 and
3000 do not differ.
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pronounced if error and post-error trials are separated only by
short time intervals.With longer intervals -in the present task with
an RSI of 750 ms or longer- PES was not observed anymore. We
extended the results by Jentzsch and Dudschig (2009) by showing
that the RSI-dependent PES effect is not exclusively due to macro-
adjustments, but is also present when the experimental timing
is more variable. That is, the RSI-dependent PES effect in their
experiment cannot solely be attributed to the assumption that
participants are in a general “speed mode” during one half of the
experiment.
Furthermore, the RSI-dependent PES effect can be observed
in different types of tasks. It seems like there is a “decay” of PES
over time that is independent of the exact task. However, in other
experiments PES has been observed with much longer RSIs than
750 ms. For instance, in some fMRI studies there was a substantial
PES effect even after 4–5 s (King et al., 2010; Danielmeier et al.,
2011). We would speculate that also in those experiments a PES
decay takes place, but that the exact timing of this decay might
depend on speciﬁc requirements of the task, e.g., on task difﬁ-
culty or whether the general task timing is faster or slower. For
instance, Jentzsch and Dudschig (2009) demonstrated a signiﬁ-
cant PES effect also for RSIs of 1000 ms. As described above, in
their task design, RSIs were varied in a block-wise manner, that is
the general timing of the task was either very fast (with short RSIs
of 50 or 100 ms) or slower for longer periods of time.
PES IS LARGER AFTER CONSCIOUS ERROR PERCEPTION THAN AFTER
UNNOTICED ERRORS
Several studies have investigated conscious error perception or
“error awareness.” These tasks aim at evoking both consciously
perceived errors and errors that go unnoticed. PES has rarely been
observed in “error awareness” tasks, that is, in this type of tasks
there seems to be no general PES effect. However, if trials are split
into consciously perceived and unperceived errors, an RT slow-
ing has been described following perceived errors, but not after
errors that were unnoticed (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; Wessel et al.,
2011). This suggests that conscious error perception is correlated
with PES. However, in a very similar antisaccade task, no PES was
observed, neither over all post-error trials nor for perceived errors
only, although a subgroup of participants did show PES (Klein
et al., 2007a). In this study by Klein et al., however, the average
trial duration was 6 s, which presumably reduced the chances of
observing PES (cf. Jentzsch and Dudschig, 2009, and Experiment
1). In a Go–Nogo task, Cohen et al. (2009) reported a signiﬁcant
PES effect after unnoticed Nogo errors, although this effect was
rather small in magnitude (3.1 ms). However, PES following con-
scious Nogo errors was considerably larger than PES following
unnoticed errors. Hester et al. (2005) investigated post-error RTs
in a different error awareness task. They reported PES only for
unaware errors, but not for aware errors. Conclusions from this
task with respect to PES are limited though, because in the trial
directly following an aware error, subjects were required to signal
their previous error instead of responding to the stimulus. That is,
subjects did not need to process the stimulus in the post-(aware-
)error trial. Therefore, it is not surprising that this study found a
post-error decrease in RT instead of an increase. In a follow-up
study, Hester et al. (2007b) demonstrated that cocaine users do
show PES after consciously perceived errors while control subjects
did not show PES in the second trial after error commission.
Thus, there is preliminary evidence that PES is larger after con-
sciously perceived errors than after unnoticed errors. However, in
order to evaluate the difference between aware and unaware errors
on post-error adjustments, further studies employing a larger vari-
ety of error awareness tasks are necessary. Ideally, these studies
would also be controlled for possible RSI effects.
PES IS GREATEST WHEN ACCURACY IS IMPORTANT
In addition to RSI and possibly error awareness, PES also depends
on the importance of responding correctly. When participants
were asked to perform the same experiment twice, once with
an instruction stressing speeded responding and once with an
instruction emphasizing accuracy, participants showed PES only
in the accuracy condition, but not under speed instructions
(Ullsperger and Szymanowski, 2004). Note that participants also
committed fewer errors in the accuracy condition.
Fiehler et al. (2005) compared two groups of participants:
one group was instructed to immediately correct their errors,
whereas the other group was not instructed to correct them-
selves, and therefore was unaware that correction responses were
recorded. PES was only observed in the non-instructed group.
The correction instruction might have reduced subjective error
relevance, because of the possibility to correct mistakes. Note that
the non-instructed group also committed fewer errors.
These experiments both suggest, that PES is only pronounced
if participants try hard to avoid errors and belief that accuracy is
crucial. Participants might adapt their motor threshold accord-
ing to speed or accuracy requirements. This could lead to more
PES when accuracy is emphasized. Alternatively, these results sug-
gest that PES occurs predominantly under conditions,when errors
are rather infrequent. The latter interpretation is corroborated
by ﬁndings from Notebaert et al. (Notebaert et al., 2009; Nunez
Castellar et al., 2010). They also observed PES only when errors
were infrequent, but not when errors were committed frequently.
THE RELIABILITY OF PES
It has been shown that the ERN amplitude is rather stable within
individuals (Segalowitz et al., 2010). Thus, the question arises
whether post-error adjustment processes, such as PES, are also
reliable within subjects. To investigate whether the PES effect is
rather stable over time, we ran a longitudinal study, where partici-
pants performed the same ﬂanker task twice at intervals of several
months.
Experiment 2
Participants and task. Fifteen volunteers (nine women; mean
age: 23.3 years; range: 18–32 years of age) with normal or
corrected-to-normal vision participated in this experiment after
signing informed consent. All but one participant were right-
handed. The experiment was carried out in accordance with the
Declaration of Helsinki. Participants were tested twice. On aver-
age, the second experimental session took place 4.6 month after
the ﬁrst session (range: 4–6 months).
The task was the same as in Danielmeier et al. (2009). This
was the same arrow version of the ﬂanker task as in Experi-
ment 1, except that the RSI did not vary systematically, but was
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set to 1000 ms. As in the original experiment, participants were
instructed to signal their errors. Because participants would not
reliably follow this instruction with an RSI of 1000 ms, the RSI
was prolonged by 800 ms in case an error was signaled. One thou-
sand trials were presented during the course of the experimental
session.
Results and discussion. Error rates were 16.8% (SEM: 1.16%)
in the ﬁrst experimental session, and 14.9% (SEM: 1.78%) in ses-
sion 2. Error rates did not differ between sessions [t (14)= 1.42;
p = 0.18]. In session 1, the average post-error RT (only correct tri-
als following errors) was 366 ms, and post-correct RT was 358 ms.
In session 2, the average post-error RT was 364 ms, and post-
correct RT was 359 ms. To account for potential baseline differ-
ences in RTs between sessions, PES was calculated here as percent
RT change in post-error trials compared to RT in correct trials.
Although the average PES effect was rather small in this experi-
ment [2.8% RT increase in session 1 (SEM: 0.94% ms) and 1.5%
in session 2 (SEM: 1.0%)], individual PES values of both sessions
showed a signiﬁcant correlation (Spearman’s rho= 0.54; p = 0.04;
Figure 3).A t -test revealed that PES did not differ between sessions
[t (14)= 1.33; p = 0.20].
In sum, the size of the individual PES effect seems to be rather
stable over a time period of several months, extending the ﬁndings
by Segalowitz et al. (2010), who reported intra-individual reliabil-
ity of PES over periods between 20 min and a couple of weeks. This
reliability of PES is corroborated by the fact that the size of the PES
effect corresponds to structural differences in white matter (WM)
tracts (Danielmeier et al., 2011), which presumably are also stable
over time.
NEUROANATOMICAL BASIS OF PES
Only few fMRI, diffusion-weighted imaging, and patient studies
have provided evidence for PES-related brain structures. Proba-
bly due to this scarce evidence, the results are not unequivocal
yet, although several studies seem to converge in that a network
FIGURE 3 | Individual PES values (calculated as RT change in post-error
trials relative to RT in correct trials) show a significant correlation
between experimental session 1 and experimental session 2.There
were on average 4.6months between the ﬁrst and the second session.
consisting of pre-SMA, lateral IFC, and the STN of the right
hemisphere plays a crucial role during the emergence of PES.
This network has originally been described by Aron et al. (2007)
by using both diffusion-weighted tractography and fMRI. They
have associated these brain areas with conﬂict-related slowing in
a conditional-stopping task.
A recent studyof our owngroupdirectly investigatedPES corre-
lates of both diffusion-weighted imaging and fMRI (Danielmeier
et al., 2011). We showed that PES is correlated with fractional
anisotropy (FA) values in white matter tracts beneath the right
pre-SMA. Probabilistic tractography revealed that this WM area
belongs to those tracts described by Aron et al. (2007) connecting
pre-SMA with lateral IFC and the STN. This suggests that PES and
conﬂict-related slowing engage the same network of brain areas.
Additionally, we found FA values in the vicinity of the left ante-
rior midcingulate region to be correlated with PES. This region
is part of a network connecting the anterior midcingulate region
with dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and more posterior parts of
the brain. This could point to the fact that at least two different
processes contribute to PES: ﬁrst, an inhibitory process acting on
the motor system, and second, the implementation of cognitive
control processes in dorsolateral frontal areas.
By using a voxel-based lesion symptom mapping (VLSM)
approach, Molenberghs et al. (2009) showed that the middle third
of the right inferior frontal sulcus is crucial for PES. Patients with
lesions in this brain area did not show any PES in the Sustained
Attention to Response task, while patients with other brain lesions
did show PES. This ﬁnding corroborates the PES tractography
result, demonstrating that the network consisting of right pre-
SMA, IFC (or probably more speciﬁc: inferior frontal sulcus), and
STN is crucial for PES. Furthermore, di Pellegrino et al. (2007)
showed that patients with lesions in the medial frontal cortex did
not showPES, in contrast to patientwith lesions outside the frontal
cortex who showed a PES effect comparable to the healthy control
group. There is also evidence from an fMRI study with healthy
participants that pre-SMA activity is correlated with PES (Klein
et al., 2007a).
In the functional data of our recent study, we found that PES
is negatively correlated with the activation level in the motor sys-
tem in post-error trials (Danielmeier et al., 2011). The activity
decrease in the motor system in turn is predicted by the level of
pMFC activity in the preceding error trial. Thus, pMFC activity
(including pre-SMA) seems to downregulate the motor system
which leads to PES. A negative correlation between motor activity
and the individual PES effect has been shown before in a different
task (King et al., 2010). This study by King et al. (2010) also found
a positive correlation between PES and the right IFJ, a frontolat-
eral brain area at the junction of the inferior frontal sulcus and the
precentral sulcus (Derrfuss et al., 2009).
However, there seem to be two functionally separable brain
areas in close proximity in this region of the brain: whereas the
posterior inferior frontal gyrus (pIFG) has been associated with
response inhibition, the IFJ has been associated with the process-
ing of infrequent events (Chikazoe et al., 2009). Both functions
might be crucial for PES. While the response inhibition function
of the pIFG would support the inhibitory account, the processing
of infrequent events in the IFJ would corroborate the orienting
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account of PES. A recent TMS study also differentiated IFJ and
pIFG of the right hemisphere functionally (Verbruggen et al.,
2010). This study concluded that IFJ detects visual changes in
stimulus features, whereas the pIFG is responsible for updating
action plans.
Taken together, there is converging evidence that the right
hemisphere is crucial for PES, and especially a network consisting
of pre-SMA, lateral inferior frontal areas, and the STN.
CONCLUSIONS ON PES
Together, PES seems to be more pronounced (a) with short than
with longRSIs, (b) following consciously perceived errors than fol-
lowing unperceived errors, (c) when errors are infrequent events,
and (d) when accuracy is emphasized over speed.
In conclusion, there is evidence for all three accounts explaining
PES: the cognitive control account, the orienting account and the
inhibitory account. We do not think that these three accounts are
mutually exclusive. There are elements in each account linking it
to another account. For instance, an orienting response most likely
recruits inhibitory processes (cf. Ursin, 2005). Also, the model by
Botvinick et al. (2001) links cognitive control, and speciﬁcally PES,
to increases in motor threshold, which could be implemented via
inhibitory processes. However, PES seems to be independent from
top-down control, but it might facilitate top-down modulations
by providing time for attentional adjustments.
Whether cognitive processes co-occur with PES or not might
depend, for instance, on task difﬁculty. If a task is not too dif-
ﬁcult, it might be worth it to try to improve performance via
top-downmodulations.However, if a task is too hard (e.g., because
stimuli are visually degraded to an extent that it seems impossi-
ble to encode them) additional recruitment of cognitive control
processes might not improve performance anymore. Likewise, if
the time interval between two stimuli is too short, so that cogni-
tive control processes cannot be implemented to their full extent,
we presumably cannot expect performance improvements after
errors.
POST-ERROR REDUCTION OF INTERFERENCE
Ridderinkhof et al. (2002) described for theﬁrst time that the inter-
ference effect in a ﬂanker task, i.e., the difference in RTs between
compatible and incompatible trials, is reduced after errors. This
is the so-called PERI effect, which is thought to reﬂect cognitive
control processes, leading to improvements in interference res-
olution in post-error trials (e.g., King et al., 2010). PERI is not
restricted to ﬂanker tasks, but has also been shown in Simon tasks
(Ridderinkhof, 2002b; King et al., 2010).
Interestingly, the PERI effect is inﬂuenced by macro-
adjustments (Ridderinkhof, 2002b), i.e., adaptations to the
broader context of a task that do not vary from trial to trial, but
that reﬂect long-term adjustments, e.g., to be more cautious in dif-
ﬁcult tasks. In the study by Ridderinkhof (2002b) the amount of
incongruent trials was varied between blocks.When more congru-
ent than incongruent trials were presented, PERI was observed. In
contrast, when more incongruent than congruent trials were pre-
sented, there was no PERI effect. Ridderinkhof (2002b) argued
that in the latter case micro-adjustments, speciﬁc to post-error
trials, were precluded by long-term macro-adjustments, that is, an
adaptation to the circumstance that most trials were incongru-
ent. When the irrelevant stimulus-dimension corresponds to the
incorrect response most of the time, this information will be more
suppressed in general compared to situations when the irrelevant
stimulus-dimension is often associated with the correct response.
Two studies investigated the effect of pharmacological treat-
ments on the PERI effect. De Bruijn et al. (2004a) demonstrated
that the PERI effect is absent under lorazepam, a benzodiazepine
that modulates fast inhibitory transmission of GABAA recep-
tors. In contrast, under the noradrenergic and speciﬁc seroton-
ergic antidepressant mirtazapine, PERI was not different from the
control condition without any pharmacological stimulation. Rid-
derinkhof et al. (2002) showed that PERI is absent after alcohol
intake,whereas control subjects did show this reduced interference
effect following erroneous trials. Alcohol intake also modulates
GABAA receptors (e.g., Steffensen et al., 2011), amongst others.
In a recent fMRI study King et al. (2010) investigated the neu-
ronal correlates of PERI in a face-version of the Simon task, where
participants responded to faces and ignored their position. They
showed that post-error activations within the left superior frontal
sulcus, the left superior colliculus, and, most importantly, the
fusiform face area were modulated by the individual PERI effect.
This suggests that modulations in task-relevant visual brain areas
are crucial for post-error interference reductions. The more activ-
ity in these areas was recorded, the greater was the PERI effect, that
is, the resolution of interference in post-error trials.
Note that PERI and PES seem to be implemented in differ-
ent neuronal networks (for a direct comparison see King et al.,
2010), suggesting that interference resolution relies more on task-
speciﬁc brain areas, whereas PES is more associated with brain
areas that modulate or are modulated by the motor threshold,
independent from the task at hand. Also, the underlying neuro-
transmitter systems seem to differ between PERI and PES: while
PERI was abolished when lorazepam was administered, PES was
unaffected by this GABAA-modulating drug.
POST-ERROR IMPROVEMENT IN ACCURACY
One crucial question is whether humans can learn from their
errors or otherwise improve their performance after committing
an error. PIA can be observed on different time-scales. On the
one hand, there are long-term learning effects following errors
or negative feedback (e.g., Klein et al., 2007b; Hester et al., 2008)
or adjustments that are observed only several trials after an error
(Hester et al., 2007a), on the other hand, e.g., in interference tasks,
there are short-term or trial-to-trial adjustments that are repre-
sented in decreased error rates directly after error commission. We
here focus on the latter type of PIAs.
The behavioral ﬁndings are not unequivocal with respect to
accuracy improvements after errors. Several studies demonstrated
improved accuracy directly after error commission (Laming, 1968,
1979; Marco-Pallares et al., 2008; Danielmeier et al., 2011; Maier
et al., 2011). Klein et al. (2007a) reported improved performance
only after errors that were consciously perceived by the subject,
but not after unnoticed errors. Other studies did not ﬁnd any
difference between post-error and post-correct error rates (cf.
Experiment 1; Hajcak et al., 2003; Hajcak and Simons, 2008) or
even a decrease in accuracy following errors, at least in certain
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experimental conditions (Rabbitt and Rodgers, 1977; Fiehler et al.,
2005). Carp and Compton (2009) showed that both ERN and
Pe amplitude correlate with post-error accuracy, in that larger
ERN/Pe amplitudes go along with better post-error accuracy. A
recent study by Seifert et al. (2011) showed that PIA and PES
are abolished in patients with thalamic lesions, whereas healthy
controls did show PIA and PES.
Since PES and PIA do not always occur together, they seem
to represent different processes. PES and PIA might follow dif-
ferent time courses. While PES is strongest following short RSIs
(see Experiment 1), accuracy decreases after errors under short RSI
conditions (Jentzsch and Dudschig, 2009). In contrast,with longer
RSIs, PES decreases and there is no difference anymore between
post-error and post-correct error rates. Post-error improvements
in accuracy might predominantly be observed with even longer
inter-trial intervals (e.g., mean ITI between 900 and 2250 ms in
Marco-Pallares et al., 2008). Thus, time courses of PES and PIA
seem to be dissociable.
Another reason, why PIA effects are not unequivocal, might be
that there could be large inter-individual differences in the time
course of attentional top-downcontrol,which results inPIA.These
might additionally interact with the type of task. The task context
could be a further factor for variations in PIA results. PIA is pre-
sumably only observable when participants really have a chance to
improve their behavior after an error. If a task is extremely difﬁcult,
i.e., task parameters are set to yield a high percentage of errors (e.g.,
stimuli are degraded and thus difﬁcult to encode), participants
might not have a chance to signiﬁcantly improve their accuracy.
Further studies are needed to specify the conditions, under which
PIA can be observed, more precisely.
A practical problem regarding PIA measures arises when par-
ticipants commit too many or not enough errors in a certain task,
leading to ceiling or ﬂoor effects in post-accuracy measures. Thus,
one needs to keep in mind that PIA results potentially depend
on the number of trials/errors in an experiment. Related to this,
researchers need to evaluate carefully, whether possible PIA val-
ues are ﬁne-grained enough. For instance, if a subject commits
10 errors in a given task, every single double error leads to an
increase of the post-error error rate by 10%. Similarly, post-error
accuracy cannot be evaluated reliably, when experiments evoke
“streaks” of errors, e.g., when experiments are designed in an
(over)adaptive fashion so that the task becomes too hard for a
too long time, if error rates are too low, and too easy, if error rates
are too high. These externally triggered task adaptations poten-
tially lead to error accumulations during periods when the task is
harder which cannot be counteracted by internal post-error adap-
tation. Thus,whenever there is the possibility that error streaks are
task-inherent, one should evaluate PIA with caution.
A recent paper by Maier et al. (2011) suggested that attentional
post-error adjustments, which presumably are the prerequisite for
performance improvements, only occur after certain error types.
They employed a ﬂanker task and found post-error attentional
adjustments only after so-called ﬂanker errors, but not after other
error types. Flanker errors are those errors where subjects were
misled by the irrelevant stimulus feature, i.e., the ﬂankers. This
suggests that, in order to investigate PIA in interference tasks, it is
worthwhile to distinguish between post-error adaptations follow-
ing those error, that are due to interferencewith irrelevant stimulus
features, and other types of errors.
GENERAL CONCLUSION
We suggest that in most tasks there are at least two post-error
processes taking place in parallel: On the one hand there is PES
which is associated with inhibitions in the motor system. On the
other hand there are adjustments in task-related brain areas, i.e.,
areas that are directly involved in encoding the stimuli. These latter
adjustments might be interpreted in terms of attentional processes
or post-error focusing (Verguts et al., 2011), forming the basis for
PERI or PIA, which seem to be independent from PES. King et al.
(2010) showed that enhanced activity in the task-relevant visual
area is accompanied with post-error speeding, not PES.
Thus, although PES seems to be independent from PERI and
PIA, it still might have facilitating effects for these other post-error
adjustments (but see Verguts et al., 2011, suggesting that slowing
and post-error focusing could also counteract each other). The
tricky part in investigating this question is that different adjust-
ments might follow different time courses. That is, there might
be inhibitory or orienting processes following error commission,
but if the time interval between the error and the following
trial is too long, this slowing can most likely not be observed
in the post-error RT anymore. The processes that lead to PES
seem to decay with time. Furthermore, for PERI and PEA there
might be other optimal time intervals to observe these effects,
and these time intervals presumably also interact with the task
context.
From a neuroanatomical perspective, PES is strongly associated
with frontal and subcortical structures of the right hemisphere
and also with activity decreases in motor areas. PERI and other
attentional adjustments act more on task-related visual areas.
However, all post-error adjustments seem to be triggered by the
pMFC (including pre-SMA and ACC), supporting the idea that
error-related pMFC activity signals the need for adjustments.
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